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y paper is to be a modest contribution to sketch out the existing connections 
between the philosophies of René Descartes and José Ortega y Gasset. This 
enterprise seéms to be an attempt doomed to failure from the outset, because it is well-
known that whereas Descartes stands for the honorific title of being the founder of philo-
sophical modernity, Ortega, as a philosopher of life, can be reckoned among the founders 
of philosophical anti-modernity. Furthermore, it is a known fact, that the Spanish 
thinker tries to substitute the vetust and respectful category of pure reason with that of 
vital reason, which is, on his part, can also be conceived as an endeavour to turn upside 
down the realm of classical idealism of consciousness. 
However, there are clear signs for a possible, opposite approach as well. If, instead of 
starting our train of thought with the statement that Ortega y Gasset's philosophy is a 
thorough critique of Cartesianism as such, we try to proceed on the opposite direction, 
we can find surprising and essential correspondences, which the relevant literature was 
silent about.1 
To begin with, it is more than surprising that Ortega, from the end of the twenties, 
has more than once given to his philosophy the name of cartesianism of life.2 This 
denomination is of crucial importance; it implies that he considers his mature philoso-
phy to be a version of cartesianism, a further developed and, in a sense, corrected type 
of cartesianism. The purpose of my paper is to argue for this denomination. For this rea-
son I try to make use of those eminent texts, where he deals with the philosophy of 
Descartes in a detailed way. There is no lack at all in such texts, which range from El tema 
de nuestro tiempo of 1923 to La idea de principio en Leibniz y la evolución de la teoría deductiva 
of 1947. 
My statement is, that it is not by chance that Ortega has called his philosophy to be 
the cartesianism of life. So, when he writes, e.g. that „the error of Descartes and the 
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knights of Spirit was not to carry out their reform of philosophy to the very end"3, he 
thinks to the continuation of this task. Or one can mention the following passage, where 
the vinculation to Descartes is quite manifest: „Let us turn, I repeat, from myths back to 
clear and distinct ideas, as they had been called with programatic solemnity by the most 
acerb mind the West ever had: by René Descartes."4 This quotation is from 1939. At this 
point I should like to call the attention to the fact that the words of appraisal towards 
Descartes were more frequent at the end of the thirties and at the beginning of the for-
ties than ever, which is, of course, not by chance. It is the time of civil war in Spain, the 
beginning of the Second World war and the peak of totalitarian systems. That is why 
Ortega puts more emphasis on reason within his theory of vital (or historical) reason and 
he could rely on the Cartesian heritage in this respect as well. 
As far as the methodical process is concerned, I should like to have recourse to the dis-
tinction Ortega has made in connection with philosophy in general: every philosophy, he 
says, consists of theoretical, patent statements (of ideomas), which can even form a system 
of their own, and, on the other hand, of metatheoretical, latent presuppositions (of drao-
mas) which form the subsoil of the philosophy in question. Now I think that in comparing 
the philosophy of Descartes and Ortega one should not concentrate exclusively on the level 
of „ideomas", but on the terrain of „draomas" as well; that is to say on the similarities of 
philosophical life-situations. What is more, on the level of ideomatic philosophy it can even 
be contradictory, what on the field of draomas is identical, or at least similar. 
The first great area, where one can clearly discern the traces of the Cartesian heritage in 
the cartesianism of life, refers to the foundation of a radical, unquestionable philosophical 
starting-point. The similarity in the draomatic situation is very clear, even if the ideomatic 
consequences are consiberably different. What was the reason of their maniac adherence to 
explore a fundamental, primordial reality, which can bring about a metaphysical certainty 
for man? The answer is obvious: the experiece of a radical lostness, desorientation. Whereas 
for Descartes it was the antique, aristotelian-scholastic philosophy which had vanished into 
nothing, for Ortega it was just the philosophy of modernity, being inaugurated right by 
Descartes. But the vital situation is common for both, and Ortega develops his argumenta-
tion of this similarity, which he applies for Descartes himself. 
Now it is well-known that Descartes tried to establish a primordial reality with the help 
of methodical doubt and, at last, he found it in the realm of the acts of consciousness, of 
the cogitationes. Ortega himself makes much use of the process of methodical doubt, but, 
at the same time, applying it to the Cartesian argumentation itself, tries to think it fur-
ther. In his study on Leibniz he draws the validity of cartesian doubt as follows: „At this 
moment we are at the principle and Descartes's principle was to doubt in all principles 
and make doubt to be the only and sufficient principle."5 In Ortega's interpretation 
Descartes has arrived to the watershed, but he does not make any step further. Where we 
are now is, that doubt is a principle, but such a principle, which is not a principle any 
more, for it calls in doubt all principles. We are confronted with a paradox, with a logical 
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paradox of „every Cretan lies". The solution lies only outside the realm of logic — as has 
been shown everlastingly by Sancho Panza6 — and the same is done by Ortega as well. That 
is to say, doubt is not only a logical-ideomatic act; it is, at the same time, a draomatic act 
as well, it leads beyond itself. In his series of lectures about historical reason in Buenos 
Aires he emphasizes that doubt does not begin in ifself; methodical doubt can be traced 
back to real doubt, as its foundation: „methodical doubt — as its name shows — is only a 
thinking which doubts, it is rather the idea — the theory —, that one has to doubt which 
is not evident. Now it is real doubt ..., previous to philosophy, which precisely leads 
Descartes to philosophize."7 That is to say, doubting is more than a simple act of think-
ing: that is what he stresses in his Lectures about metaphysics as well: „Well, what exists, 
when there occurs doubt in an absolute sense? There is me, who doubts, and there is 
something else, that is doubtful for me. Both terms are equally unavoidable in order to be 
doubt as such. And what is doubtful, is not doubt, it is not me, it is not subjectivity ... 
What is 'doubtful' is a feature, how the world is presented to me, when I doubt."8 One 
hardly can exaggerate the importance of these assertions. The very same act, that is to say, 
the act of doubting, which had led Descartes to deny the indisputably certain existence of 
the world and, further, to found the realm of the cogitatio as a primordial reality, this very 
act now turns against Cartesian argumentation and leads to the supposition of an estab-
lished being of the external world. There remains the Cartesian heritage, but precisely 
to surpass cartesianism. Accordingly, he emphasizes the necessity of reversing the funda-
mental thesis of Descartes in his lecture held in Granada, in 1932: „You have begun to 
think 'because' previously you had existed and this existence of Your Excellency was to 
find yourself shipwrecked in something, which is called world without knowing what it is 
— hence it is doubtful — and, as a result, it is something distinct from Your Excelleny, 
because, as Your Excellency assures us, one can not doubt purely out of himself."9 
The result, where methodical doubt leads, was the discovery of the inner world of cogi-
tationes in Descartes, where real doubt leads, is the discovery of life, as primordial reality 
in Ortega. Although the realm of cogitatio and that of life fundamentally differ from one 
another, nevertheless there can be found some common elements, where Ortega does not 
simply deny the Cartesian position, but rather thinks it fourther. 
Such a common element is the requirement of immediacy. Ortega, just like Descartes, 
does not only search for a new starting-point which is indisputable, absolute certainty, but 
which is, at the same time, something personal, immediate, something given in the very 
core of immediacy. The fascinating liveliness of his philosophy, where life really gets the 
opportunity to speak, is due to the complete validation of immediacy. However, the mas-
ter, the great archetype to be followed was Descartes in this respect as well. „The brilliant 
discovery of Descartes consists in taking notice of the fact that 'there exists something, in 
which the existence referring to me and absolute existence are identical, or, to put it 
another way, there is something, whose absolute existence consists in existing for me..."10 
Precartesian philosophies always set out from some kind of absolute being (Being, idea, 
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God etc.), which had an indisputable ontological priority in respect to the subject., so they 
were lacking immediacy. The significance of the turn made by Descartes is not only that 
in the form of cogitatio he has discovered a radically new starting-point, but also that the 
new starting-point is something immediate at the same time. It is not that which is for 
me, is absolute (because it would mean solipsism), but the point under discussion is that 
there is something, whose existence for me is something absolute at the same time. In this 
respect, that is in emphasizing immediacy, Ortega has remained a follower of Cartesian 
philosophy all the time. 
This is, however, only one side of the coin; at this point he breaks out from the spell 
of Descartes and goes his own way further on: „It is necessary to divide the Cartesian rea-
soning in two directions of very different value: one, which concludes with the assertion 
that radical reality is immediacy as such.... The other direction contains a different asser-
tion, which adds something new to it saying: this immediate reality, this existence for me 
is thinking."11 The Spanish thinker draws the lines clearly and unambiguously, what he 
accepts and refuses. His endeavour is, however, not only the refusal of cartesianism, but 
its continuation and deepening as well. What we shall get as a result is — Cartesianism of 
life. 
To begin with: the breaking through of the walls of cogitationes happens in the intu-
ition of life. I should like to emphasize that the breakthrough of the world of ego cogito 
does not mean that external world is simply added to it. To conceive the new starting-
point means a fundamentally different view of world; one has only to refer to the fact that 
Ortega has firmly criticized the static character of the Cartesian subject. Nevertheless, one 
can clearly discern the traces of Cartesian heritage in the primordial intuition of life: „an 
essential and primordial attribute of life is to see it-self (el verse a si mismo). Life is to know 
our-selves. It is evidential."12 That is to say, those very means, which had served to conceive 
the ego cogito, now are for the discovery of life, as primordial reality. The world is not ra-
dically heterogeneous to consciousness, but is simply presented in it, constituting this way 
the reality we call life: „Every other reality is given in the occurrence of life for everyone — 
even those which pretend to transcend it — as presence, announcement, or symptom."13 
In brief, it is not to give a philosophical explanation of the demolition of the wall around 
the Cartesian subject of consciousness, but rather the other way around: it is precisely the 
building up of this Chinese wall between the subject and object that needs explanation. 
And this also is well-known: it is not less than the substantialization, the reification of the 
ego cogito, but at the moment we should not like to make a detailed analysis about it. 
The next question refers to method, where we can find the same relationship between 
Descartes and Ortega. First of all I have to emphasize that Ortega, in spite of the fact of 
being an essayist, attached great importance to method. So it is only natural, that he fre-
quently refers to method in connection with Descartes: „Descartes is eminently a man of 
method. I have already mentioned at the very beginning that all philosophers are men of 
method, but not all of them set forth it in detail, that is to say, they are not the one titu-
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larly. The fact is that Descartes nowhere in his papers had explained formally his 
method..."14 The second half of the statement is more than astonishing, because there are 
several works of Descartes — let us just think on Discourse of Method — where he deals with 
method in a detailed way. The question is, what Ortega means by the term „method". 
First, he lays great stress on the fact that in the case of Descartes the matter in question is 
not theoretical method as such, but the application of a given method. Second and more 
important, he stresses in his study on Leibniz, that in the case of Descartes there are close 
links between life and method: „Descartes lays great stress on making us see that it is not 
only his thinking that conforms to method, but his life has been methodical as well. That 
is why telling us the steps of his life he is to expound his method to us. This is represent-
ed in the Discourse as a pure sequence of reasonings...."15 According to this, Cartesian 
method becomes profoundly absorbed in the conduct of living, in personal behaviour, 
here is the reason of its gloomy character. Descartes's own life, taken as a text, turns to be 
the best explanation of his method. Ortega's interpretation tries to set free the Cartesian 
method from that lifeless prison, where it had been locked by habitual interpretations on 
Descartes. Furthermore, the supposition of the close link between method and life brings 
about the possibility of a critique of Descartes-philology, which had exercised only a tex-
tual approach towards the Discourse and it was unable to take notice of those life-experi-
ences, that can be clearly felt in its background. Last, but not least; the Cartesian pattern 
of the unity of life and method provides a model to be followed for him; the philosophy 
of Ortega can be called the Cartesianism of life in this respect as well. 
We have chosen the category of intuition to illustrate in brief the creative possibility 
of Cartesian method for Cartesianism of life. As it is well-known, Descartes attributed a 
fundamental role to intuition; he glimpses in it the guarantee of getting such a knowledge, 
whose certainty is beyond any doubt.16 Ortega deals with the interpretation of Cartesian 
intuition briefly in his study on Leibniz. He is impressed, in the first place, by the indis-
putability contained in intuition and, furhermore, by the fact that intuitiv knowledge is 
something ultimate, cannot be deduced from anything else. There is, however, a further 
moment, which endows intuition with a fundamental importance for the philosophy of 
Ortega y Gasset; it concerns the relational character of intuition: „The point in question 
is the connection of two things — the self and existence, sphere and limitation by a unique 
surface. Intuition means to see this connection, that is to say, to understand or to notice 
of it and, at the same time, to see it as something necessary and indisputable. This neces-
sity does not have its foundation outside the simple mental presence of the connection. 
It is one and the same thing to think it and to perceive that it cannot be in another way. 
That is what Descartes calls 'evidence'."" Now I think that precisely this interpretation of 
Cartesian intuition gives a starting-point for Ortega to apprehend life as a primordial real-
ity. Life is called already at the lectures of 1929 as a most patent, clearly transparent being, 
an immediate evidence, presence. We are aware of life as a radical reality by means of the 
same immediate, intuitive certainty, as it had been formulated by Descartes. And here 
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comes the gist of the matter: if intuition is something relational, then it is just this cir-
cumstance, which comes into the foreground in the intuition of life, because it is nothing 
else, but the coexistence of the self and the world. That is to say, in the intuition of life 
as the coexistence of the self and the world Ortega explicitly makes use of the Cartesian 
intuition, Cartesianism becomes the promoter of Gartesianism of life. Nevertheless, as far 
as the direction of thinking is concerned, there is a fundamental opposition; whereas 
intuition meant for Descartes just the turning away from the external world and the dis-
covery of the indisputable realm of the pure contents of the mind, Ortega, quite the con-
trary, has surpassed the idealism of consciousness in the philosophy of modernity just by 
the help of intuition, intuiting life as radical reality. 
Finally, I should like to emphasize that it was precisely the Cartesian heritage, which 
made him possible to stick to the category of life and not to lose the possibility of work-
ing out an ontology based on life itself. It is well-known that in Being and Time Heidegger 
refuses the philosophy of life, let alone an ontology of life, on the following basis: „On the 
other hand, if we understand it rightly, in any serious and scientifically-minded 'philoso-
phy of life' ... there lies an unexpressed tendency towards an understanding of Dasein's 
Being. What is conspicuous in such a philosophy (and here it is defective in principle) is 
that here 'life' itself as a kind of Being does not become ontologically a problem."18 This 
statement can be retorted, first, by the fact that a philosophy of life, as a metaphysics of 
life does not exclude in principle the intuititon of ontological problems - and Ortega's 
philosophy belongs to this category and, secondly, it is just the starting-point of life, where 
one can put questions which are primary ones even with respect to such categories as 
„thinking" or „being". It is not by chance, when he writes in his study on Leibniz the fol-
lowing: „The result is that we have to ask questions in the order of reality not that what 
kind of things are, or what is and how is, what exists, but why is in the universe this X, we 
call Being".19 And that is the point; how could Being become the subject-matter of any pos-
sible investigation, how and when did it get into that privileged position what its status is 
concerned in the history of philosophy. And, according to my judgement, it was precise-
ly Cartesian philosophy, which helped a lot for Ortega in avoiding the starting-point of 
Being as such. 
To sum up: the philosophy of Ortega y Gasset relies on the tenets of Descartes in many 
respects, and Cartesianism permeates his philosophy much deeper as it had been thought, 
of in the relevant literature. I should like to finish my paper by making a remark about 
the close relationship of Cartesianism of life and Mediterranean way of living. It is well-
known that the Spanish philosopher thought of Mediterranean way of living and the 
world of Modernity to be two realms, which are rather far from one another. „For our peo-
ples it is very difficult to get accustomed to the peculiar, unique feature ...that constitutes 
thinking and subjectivity. For Nordic people, on the contrary, it is rather easy and obvi-
ous. Since the idea of subjectivity is, as I have already mentioned, the basic principle of 
the whole Modern Age, one can casually refer to it as one of the reasons, why 
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Mediterranean people have never been entirely modern ones." 2 01 th ink that Ortega, right 
in his doctrine concerning the Cartesianism of life, could dispense justice to both ; to 
modernity, being able, on one hand, to make the transformed Cartesian subjectivity to be 
an inalienable part o f his doctrine, and, to Mediterranean way o f living, on the o ther 
hand, in so far as his philosophy — as a philosophy o f life — opens infinitely wide ahead 
o f the inexhaustible richness o f the wold, and gives itself to her in an intoxicating joy. 
W h e n he, in 1929, called life to be „tranparent being",21 he has bowed the head b o t h to 
Descartes, his master, as far as clearness and distinctness is concerned and to the 
Mediterranean way o f living, o f a thousand colours. So his philosophy, the Cartesianism 
o f life, can be characterized as a reflexive restitution o f Mediterraneum. 
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